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ABSTRACT
An analysis was performed of the safety-related
performance of the reactor protection system (RPS) at
U.S. General Electric commercial reactors during the
period 1984 through 1995.  RPS operational data were
collected from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System
and Licensee Event Reports.  A risk-based analysis was
performed on the data to estimate the observed
unavailability of the RPS, based on a fault tree model of
the system.  Results were compared with existing
unavailability estimates from Individual Plant
Examinations and other reports.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Operational experience of the U.S. General Electric
RPS from 1984 through 1995 was studied and
documented in the report Reliability Study:  General
Electric Reactor Protection System, 1984 - 1995. 1  The
analysis focused on the ability of the RPS to
automatically shut down the reactor given a plant upset
condition requiring a reactor trip while the plant is at full
power.  RPS spurious reactor trips or component failures
not affecting the automatic shutdown function were not
considered.  Systems added as part of the anticipated
transient without scram (ATWS) mitigation effort were
not included in the analysis.
The General Electric RPS is a complex control
system comprising numerous electronic components that
combine to provide the ability to produce an automatic or
manual rapid shutdown of the nuclear reactor, known as a
reactor trip or scram.  In spite of its complexity, the
General Electric RPS can be roughly divided into four
segments – channels, trip system, hydraulic control units
(HCUs) and related components, and rods – as shown in
Figure 1.  The rods segment includes the control rods and
associated control rod drives (CRDs).  General Electric
RPSs typically have 120 to 190 control rods and
associated CRDs.  The HCU segment includes the HCU
components:  scram pilot solenoid-operated valves
(SOVs), scram inlet and outlet air-operated valves
(AOVs), and scram accumulator.  There is one HCU for
each control rod and CRD combination.  The HCU
segment also includes the scram discharge volume (SDV)
and two backup scram SOVs controlling instrument air to
the scram air header.  For the trip system, all but one of
the General Electric plants have relay-based trip systems.
Clinton, a boiling water reactor 6 (BWR/6) design, is the
only General Electric plant to have a solid-state trip
system.  Finally, all of the designs have four channels.
RPS Segments
Channels Trip
System
HCU and
Related
Components
Rods
4 channels
(A – D,
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A2, B1, and
B2)
2 trip
systems
(A and B),
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solid state;
scram
logic and
backup
scram
logic
120 to 190
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SDVs
120 to 190
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Figure 1.  Segments of General Electric RPS.
The analysis of the General Electric RPS was based
on the Peach Bottom 2 plant design, which is a BWR/4
design.  This configuration is representative of the
General Electric plant designs except for Clinton, which
has a solid-state trip system.  The General Electric RPS
includes many different types of trip signals.  The trip
signals include various neutron flux indications, reactor
pressure and level, primary containment pressure, and
others.  For this study, two of the trip signals were
modeled:  reactor vessel high pressure and low water
level.
The trip system portion of the RPS includes two
systems or trains, A and B.  Channels A and C feed into
trip system A, and channels B and D feed into trip
system B.  A scram signal is generated if one of two
channel sensors associated with each of the two trip
systems detects a scram condition.  This is termed a one-
out-of-two-twice logic.  Given a scram signal, the two
SOVs in each HCU cut off the air supply to the scram
inlet and outlet valves, causing them to open.  (The air
supply to all the HCUs is also cut off through the backup
scram logic, which opens backup scram SOVs that
control the air supply to the air header.)  This allows the
CRD to drive the control rod up into the core.  In order for
the control rod to insert into the core, drive water is
drained into the SDV.  For the RPS to fail, one of the trip
systems and the backup scram system must fail, a
sufficient number of channel failures must occur, or a
sufficient number of control rods must fail to insert.
Since only two diverse trip signals were modeled, 1 of 2
channels for each trip system for each of the two trip
signals must fail.  It was assumed that 33% or more of the
185 Peach Bottom 2 control rods must fail to fully insert
(in a random pattern).  A sensitivity study was conducted
to determine the impact on RPS unavailability from this
assumption.
Testing of the General Electric RPS can be
summarized by RPS segment (Figure 1).  Generally, the
RPS channels are functionally tested every three months,
with the channel being placed in a bypass condition
during the test.  Weekly manual scram (or automatic
actuator) tests cover the trip system logic.  The HCUs,
control rods, and associated CRDs are tested every
refueling or 18 months.  Also, 10% of these are tested
every four months while the plant is at power.
II.  SYSTEM FAULT TREE
A system fault tree was constructed for the Peach
Bottom 2 (BWR/4) RPS design.  The level of detail in the
fault tree includes sensor/transmitters, trip units and
switches, relays, SOVs, AOVs, scram accumulators,
control rods and CRDs, and the SDV.  As noted
previously, two trip signals were included in the fault tree,
even though at least three signals are typically generated
for plant upset conditions.  A sensitivity study was
conducted to determine the impact on RPS unavailability
if three trip signals had been modeled.
Common-cause failures (CCFs) across similar
components were explicitly modeled in the RPS fault tree.
In general, CCF events were defined to involve sufficient
failures of the component type to fail the RPS.  Lower-
order CCF events, which must be combined with random
component failures to cause an RPS failure, were not
included in the fault tree.  Results of the fault tree
quantification were reviewed to ensure that the exclusion
of lower-order CCF events did not significantly impact
the results.
Test and maintenance outages and associated RPS
configurations were modeled for channel outages.  For
channel outages, the channel was assumed to be placed
into a bypass condition, rather than a tripped mode.
The Peach Bottom 2 (BWR/4) RPS fault tree model
included approximately 70 basic events, of which
approximately 20 were CCF events.  Approximately
4,000 cut sets were generated when the fault tree model
was solved using the SAPHIRE computer code. 2
III.  DATA REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
U.S. General Electric RPS performance during the
period 1984 through 1995 was assessed by reviewing
Licensee Event Reports and the Nuclear Plant Reliability
Data System (NPRDS) reports.  Thirty-four U.S. General
Electric nuclear power plants were covered in the study.
Approximately 7,000 reports were identified.  Of these
7,000, approximately 600 involved actual component
failures (independent or CCF) applicable to this study.
The data review process involved at least two
independent reviews of each event report by
knowledgeable engineers.  Each event was characterized
by safety function impact (fail-safe, non-fail-safe, or
unknown) and degree of failure (complete failure, no
failure, or unknown).  This resulted in a three-by-three
matrix, with nine different bins into which an event could
be placed, as indicated in Figure 2.  This classification
scheme resulted in one bin with non-fail-safe, complete
failures of components.  Three other bins may also
contain such events, but lack of information from the
event report did not allow the analysts to determine
whether the events were non-fail-safe, complete failures.
Safety Function Impact
Non-fail-
safe,
complete
failure a
Unknown
safety function
impact,
complete
failure b
Fail-safe,
complete
failure c
Non-fail-
safe,
unknown
complete-
ness b
Unknown
safety function
impact,
unknown
completeness b
Fail-safe,
unknown
complete-
ness c
Failure
Complete-
ness
Non-fail-
safe, no
failure c
Unknown
safety function
impact, no
failure c
Fail-safe,
no failure c
a.  Events in this bin receive weights of 1.0.
b.  Events in these bins receive weights of <1.0.
c.  Events in these bins are not applicable.
Figure 2.  Data classification scheme.
The data analysis considered events from these four bins
(shaded bins in Figure 2), using a weighting scheme to
account for the uncertainty in the unknown events.
Data analysis for the component failures involved
several steps:
1. Demand count and exposure time estimation
2. Statistical analysis of data subgroups to identify
differences
3. Component unavailability estimation
4. CCF event unavailability estimation
5. Trending with time evaluation.
The component demand counts were estimated from plant
scram histories (for those components demanded by a
scram), and testing intervals (generally weekly, every
three months, or every 18 months).
Statistical analysis of data subgroups was performed
to identify differences in component performance
resulting from plant mode (at power or shutdown), time
period (1984 – 1989 versus 1990 – 1995), or type of
demand (scram or test).  The data from the selected data
subgroup were then analyzed to determine component
failure probabilities or rates.
Results of the data analysis to determine component
failure probabilities or rates are presented in Figure 3.
The numbers of component failures listed in Figure 3 are
generally subsets of the total number of failures identified
in the data review.  For example, if the data subgroup
analysis indicated a significant difference in component
performance between 1984 – 1989 and 1990 – 1995, then
only the 1990 – 1995 data were used.  In general, the
resultant component failure probabilities and rates are
comparable with existing estimates. 3 through 5
Quantification of the CCF events in the fault tree was
performed using the alpha factor method outlined in the
report Common-Cause Failure Database and Analysis
System:  Event Definition and Classification. 6  Only CCF
events associated with the General Electric RPS during
the period 1984 through 1995 were used in the
quantification process.  Several steps were required in the
overall CCF evaluation:
1. Characterization of CCF data (component group size,
impact vector, shared cause and timing factors, and
failure completeness factor)
2. Characterization of CCF events modeled in the fault
trees (component group size and required number of
component failures)
3. Development of alpha factor equations for each of
the CCF events modeled
4. Development of an appropriate prior for the alpha
factors
5. Mapping up or down of CCF data to match the
component group sizes modeled in the fault trees
6. Quantification of CCF event probabilities using
component-specific CCF data and the prior.
Selected results of the CCF event quantification
process are presented in Figure 4.  In general, the CCF
event probabilities reflect multipliers (from the alpha
factor equations) of 0.002 to 0.09 on the component
failure probabilities.  These multipliers are influenced by
the specific failure criterion (minimum number of
component failures required and size of component
group), strength of the component-specific CCF data, and
the prior distribution for the alpha factors obtained from
the General Electric CCF data.  In general, there were
very few complete CCF events (where all the components
in the group fail due to a common cause).  Also, there
were no complete CCF events in the higher-order group
sizes.
Trending analysis over time was performed for the
component failure probabilities and the number of CCF
events.  None of the 11 component types exhibited
significant increasing or decreasing trends over time with
respect to failure probabilities.
The number of CCF events reported each year
dropped over the period 1984 – 1995.  This is the result of
two component types exhibiting decreasing trends over
time.  The remaining nine exhibited no trends.  Therefore,
none of the component types exhibited increasing
numbers of CCF events over time.  Most of the
component trends (or lack of trends) were supported by a
limited number of CCF events.
IV.  RESULTS
The General Electric RPS fault tree was quantified
using the basic event data presented in Figures 3 and 4.
The resultant RPS mean unavailability (failure probability
upon demand) is 5.8E-6, assuming no credit for operator
action.  This result is for the Peach Bottom 2 (BWR/4)
RPS design, which is considered to be representative of
most BWRs.  If credit is taken for the operator to actuate
the manual scram switch, then the mean unavailability
drops to 2.6E-6.  Dominant failures involve CCFs of the
HCU and backup scram SOVs, channel trip units
(bistables), control rods and CRDs, trip system contactor
relays, and channel relays.  CCF events contribute over
99% to the RPS unavailability.
The General Electric RPS unavailability results can
be broken down into contributions by each of the four
segments.  These breakdowns are presented in Figure 5.
Component Type Number
of
Failures a
Number of
Demands or
Hours
Failure
Probability or
Rate b
Basic Event Description
HCU accumulator 1
(0.5)
43883 2.2E-5 HCU accumulator fails to discharge upon
demand to assist the control rods to insert into
the core
HCU scram inlet or
outlet AOV
1
(1.0)
522306 2.9E-6 HCU scram inlet or outlet AOV fails to open
upon demand
Trip unit (bistable) 7
(4.0)
15026 2.9E-4 Channel trip unit (bistable) bails to trip at its
setpoint
Level sensor/
transmitter
10
(4.9)
6750 7.7E-4 Channel reactor vessel level sensor/transmitter
fails to detect a low level and send a signal to
the trip unit
Pressure sensor/
transmitter
0
(0.0)
8753 5.7E-5 Channel reactor vessel pressure sensor/
transmitter fails to detect a high pressure and
send a signal to the trip unit
Manual scram switch 0
(0.0)
38469 1.3E-5 Manual scram switch fails to operate upon
demand
Control rod and
associated CRD
6
(2.7)
62365 5.0E-5 Control rod or associated CRD fails to insert
fully into core upon demand
Level switch 4
(3.3)
6075 6.1E-4 Channel (SDV high level) process switch fails
to detect a high level and send an appropriate
signal to the relay
HCU scram pilot SOV
or backup scram SOV
84
(50.1)
77845 7.0E-4 HCU scram pilot SOV (or backup scram SOV)
fails to cut off and vent air supply to AOVs
Relay 13
(10.8)
579677 1.9E-5 Channel or trip system relay fails to de-energize
upon demand
a.  Includes uncertain events and CCF events.  The number in parentheses is the weighted average number of failures,
resulting from the inclusion of uncertain events in Figure 2 (shaded bins).
b.  The failure probability or rate calculation involves a complex simulation process to account for potential non-fail-safe,
complete failure events (the three bins in Figure 2 with the “b” footnote).  However, the probability can be approximated by
the expression (n+0.5)/(D+1), where n is the weighted number of failures (in parentheses in column 2) and D is the number
of demands.  The failure rate can be approximated by the expression (n+0.5)/T, where T is the time in hours.
Figure 3.  General Electric RPS component failure probabilities.
Component Type Number
of CCF
Events
Component
Failure
Probability
CCF Event
Probability
CCF Event Description
HCU accumulator 3 2.2E-5 1.1E-7 CCF 33% or more of 185 HCU accumulators fail
HCU scram inlet or
outlet AOV
2 2.9E-6 6.9E-9 CCF 33% or more of 370 HCU scram inlet/outlet AOVs
fail to open
Trip unit (bistable) 4 2.9E-4 3.1E-6 CCF specific 4 or more of 8 channel bistables
Level sensor/
transmitter
16 7.7E-4 7.1E-5 CCF specific 2 or more of 4 level sensor/transmitters
Pressure sensor/
transmitter
2 5.7E-5 4.9E-6 CCF specific 2 or more of 4 pressure sensor/transmitters
Manual scram switch 0 1.3E-5 7.7E-7 CCF of 2 of 2 manual scram switches
SDV level switch 0 6.1E-4 3.1E-5 CCF specific 2 or more of 4 SDV level switches
Control rod and
associated CRD
22 5.0E-5 2.5E-7 CCF 33% or more of 185 control rod/CRDs
HCU scram pilot and
backup scram SOV
21 7.0E-4 1.7E-6 CCF 33% or more of 370 HCU scram pilot SOVs and 2
of 2 backup scram SOVs
Relay 11 1.9E-5 3.8E-7 CCF specific 4 or more of 8 trip system relays
Figure 4.  Selected General Electric RPS CCF event probabilities.
RPS Unavailability
RPS Segment No Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Credit for
Manual Scram
by Operator
Channel 3.4E-6 (58%) 1.4E-7 (5%)
HCU and related 1.9E-6 (32%) 1.9E-6 (71%)
Trip system 3.8E-7 (6%) 3.8E-7 (14%)
Rod 2.5E-7 (4%) 2.5E-7 (10%)
Total RPS 5.8E06 2.6E-6
Figure 5.  General Electric RPS unavailability by
segment.
Channel CCF failures dominate, contributing 58.0% to
the total.  However, this drops to only 5% of the total if
credit is taken for manual scram by the operator.  HCU
related CCF failures contribute 32%.  However, this
increases to 71% if credit is taken for manual scram.  The
trip system contributes 6%, while the rod/CRDs
contribute 4%.
Finally, uncertainty results are presented in Figure 6.
These uncertainty results incorporate only data
uncertainties.  They do not include any modeling
uncertainties.  Sensitivity studies were conducted to
address certain modeling issues, such as the failure
criterion for control rod/CRDs, use of two rather than
three reactor trip signals in the fault tree, and others.  In
general, the sensitivity studies indicated that the data
uncertainty results cover most of the modeling
uncertainties.  However, the choice of prior distribution
for the alpha factors in the CCF calculations can
significantly impact the RPS unavailability results.
The General Electric RPS unavailabilities obtained
from the 1984 – 1995 data are compared with Individual
Plant Examination (IPE) estimates in Figure 7.  The IPE
RPS estimates range from approximately 1.0E-6 to
1.0E-3.  Because of the lack of detailed information in the
IPE submittals, it is not clear which estimates included
credit for operator action.  The uncertainty ranges
obtained in this study do not cover most of the IPE range
of RPS unavailabilities.  The RPS results obtained from
this study are generally significantly lower than many of
the IPE RPS unavailability estimates.
Unavailability
RPS Case 5th
Percen-
tile
Median Mean 95th
Percen-
tile
No manual
scram
1.8E-6 4.6E-6 5.8E-6 1.4E-5
Manual scram 5.2E-7 1.6E-6 2.6E-6 7.7E-6
Figure 6.  General Electric RPS uncertainty results.
V.  DISCUSSION AND INSIGHTS
CCF events contribute over 99% to the RPS
unavailabilities obtained in this study.  Quantification of
the CCF events in the RPS fault trees is a complex
process.  The channel and trip system portions of the RPS
fault tree contain component group sizes ranging from
two to 12, while the HCU and rod portions contain group
sizes of 185 and 370.  Separate priors for the alpha factors
were developed for the channel and trip system
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Figure 7.  General Electric IPE RPS unavailabilities.
component CCFs and for the HCU and rod component
CCFs.  These priors were based only on General Electric
RPS component CCFs.  The priors were then updated
using CCF data specific to the component in question.  In
several cases the component-specific CCF data were
sparse, resulting in a strong influence by the prior.
However, this RPS CCF quantification is believed to be
the most comprehensive and component-specific effort to
date.  The effort would not have been possible without the
methodology outlined in the report Common-Cause
Failure Database and Analysis System:  Event Definition
and Classification.
Several insights were obtained from this study:
1. CCF events involving the HCU SOVs (and backup
SOVs) contribute 32% to the overall RPS
unavailability.  The most significant historical event,
involving the use of improper seating material and
affecting all of the HCU SOVs, occurred in 1984.
Two similar types of SOV CCF events occurred in
1994 but did not affect as many of the components.
Several events involving improper use of liquid
thread sealant also caused significant CCF events.  It
is believed that the requirement to test 10% of the
control rods each four months helped discover these
problems (developing over time) before they
developed into catastrophic failures.
2. The backup scram portion of the RPS may be an
important contributor to the low RPS unavailability,
based on sensitivity studies conducted as part of this
project and uncertainties associated with the SOV
failure characteristics.  (Without the backup scram
logic, only a specific two of eight trip system relay
failures are needed to fail the RPS, rather than a
specific four of eight if the backup scram system is
modeled.)  The backup scram SOVs are classified as
non-safety-related, and these valves are not part of
the NPRDS reportable scope for the General Electric
RPS.  Therefore, no failure data were collected for
these valves.  Also, it is not clear how often these
valves are tested, and what their failure probabilities
are.  This study assumed these valves are tested every
18 months during shutdown, and that their failure
characteristics are similar to the HCU SOVs.  These
assumptions need to be verified.
3. The trends in component failure probabilities and
numbers of CCF events are generally flat over the
period 1984 through 1995.  Therefore, existing RPS
surveillance and maintenance practices and industry
lessons learned programs have been effective in
preventing increasing failure probabilities.
4. There were significant SDV problems in the early
1980s involving both drainage of SDVs and level
instrumentation, dominated by the 1980 Browns
Ferry Unit 3 failure of 76 of 185 control rods to
insert.  Data collected during the period 1984 through
1995 indicate that SDV instrumentation failure
probabilities are similar to other RPS trip
instrumentation.  Also, only one inadvertent filling of
the SDV while a plant was at power was identified
during the period.  Finally, the RPS fault tree
quantification indicates that SDV events leading to
failure of the RPS contribute less than 1% to the
overall RPS unavailability.  Therefore, early SDV-
related problems in General Electric RPSs are no
longer dominant contributors to RPS unavailability.
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